Microfinance institutions (MFIs) lend to the poor, fostering these individuals' financial inclusion. However, microfinance clients suffer from high interest rates, a type of poverty penalty. Reducing margins and lowering interest rates should be a target for MFIs with a strong social commitment. This paper analyzes the determinants of margin in MFIs. A banking model has been adapted to the case of MFIs. This model has been empirically tested using 9-year panel data. Some factors explaining bank margin also explain MFI margin, with operating expenses being the most important factor. Specific microfinance factors are donations and legal status, as regulated MFIs can collect deposits. It has also been found that MFIs operating in countries with a high level of financial inclusion have low margins. 
Introduction
Microfinance institutions (MFIs) lend to the poor, who are traditionally excluded from financial services. Their presence has been a step forward in poverty alleviation as well as the empowerment of women. However, many MFIs charge very high interest rates, which is controversial. This practice is an example of poverty penalty: the poor pay high interest rates to enter the credit market (Prahalad and Hammond, 2002) . This paper, adapting a banking model, studies the determinant factors of MFIs margin. The main motivation of this paper is to identify the factors driving this margin. If these factors are known, a way to reduce the margin will be available, and entities with a social mission will be able to reduce their interest rates.
Since the seminal work by Ho and Saunders (1981) , several studies have analyzed the factors determining bank margin. Allen (1988) and Angbazo (1997) include factors such as interest and credit risk; Maudos and Fernández de Guevara (2004) include bank efficiency; Saunders and Schumacher (2000) study solvency regulations and Carbó and Rodríguez (2007) or Lepetit et al. (2008) incorporate product diversification. Maudos and Solís (2009) test in a comprehensive model the main additions to the Ho and Saunders (1981) model.
The research question in this paper is as follows: what are the margin determinants in microfinance? To the best of our knowledge, this question has not been previously studied.
Financial margin is a MFIs performance measure and is included as an independent variable in several works, such as Mersland and Strøm (2008) , Mersland and Strøm (2009) , Mersland (2009) and Ahlin et al. (2011) .
Commercial banks maximize profits. Profits can be maximized by reducing costs or by increasing revenues. There is a consensus to reduce costs in MFIs. However, there is a debate over whether to increase revenues in MFIs (Gulli, 1998) , which is still unresolved (Hermes and Lensink, 2011) . The financial systems approach emphasizes the idea of MFI sustainability: if MFIs are simply considered to be banks with poor clients, conventional banking models could be directly applied to the MFIs' case. The poverty lending approach favors subsidized interest rates. It supports sustainability, but individuals' sustainability, not institutions' sustainability.
MFIs have specific characteristics in their funding structure that may explain their margin. Representing an example are donations, whose role has been widely discussed in the microfinance literature since Morduch (1999) . The relationship between donations and margin must be studied.
Another specific aspect of microfinance is regulation (Hartarska and Nadolnyak, 2007) . Many MFIs only lend; they do not collect deposits because they are not supervised by the monetary authorities. They only perform half of the banking business. Regulation allows them to access a cheap funding source: deposits. However, the collection of small amounts implies high costs. It is important to study how deposits influence the margin.
Another potential thread of research is the study of the relationship between the type of institution and margin. There are NGOs in the microfinance market, but there are also conventional banks downscaling into the sector, credit cooperatives and Non-Banking Financial Institutions (NBFI). Mersland and Strøm (2009) and Servin et al. (2012) have studied the relationship between the type of institution and efficiency.
The contribution of this paper is twofold. First, it formulates a model to explain margin determinants in microfinance. Second, it empirically tests this model by using standard panel data techniques with a 9-year sample of MFIs. It includes variables that influence the margin in commercial banks. It also includes microfinance-specific variables: funding-related variables, such as donations or deposits, social performance variables and the type of institution.
The most recent debate in microfinance concerns mission drift. MFIs focused on financial objectives run the risk of losing their social objectives, Mersland and Strøm (2010) . Abnormally high margins can be a type of mission drift. Processing many small loans can be a justification because the administrative costs of doing so are high. To shed light on this question, the empirical study in this paper analyzes a subsample of MFIs that only lend to the poorest; those with an average loan size under $300. These MFIs have not drifted from their mission in terms of their target but may have drifted from their mission in terms of their margins, which may go beyond reasonable limits. The model has been tested with this subsample of pure MFIs as well as with the subsample of MFIs with an average loan size over $300.
The next section presents the literature revision and describes the theoretical model. Section 3 justifies the empirical model. Section 4 presents the empirical results. In the final section, the conclusions are discussed.
Theoretical model
The interest margin model used in this paper is based on the original proposal by Ho and Saunders (1981) and further extensions by Angbazo (1997) and Maudos and Fernández de Guevara (2004) . The financial institution is considered a risk-averse agent that operates as a financial intermediary in the loans and deposits market, with the aim of maximizing a mean-variance objective function in end-of-period wealth. The wealth of the institution (W) is obtained as the difference between its assets (loans, L and investments in the monetary market, M) and its liabilities (deposits, D):
A period later, this wealth can be expressed as follows:
Where represents the profitability of the net loan balance and 
 l,d represents the probability of giving a loan or collecting a deposit.  measures the loans and deposits' demand sensibility to margin variations.
First-order conditions for a and b in the utility function allow obtaining the optimal interest margin (see Maudos and Fernandez de Guevara, 2004 , for a full development of the model):
The margin is obtained by three terms:
i) The first term, α/β, is a measure of the pure margin in a risk-neutral institution (risk-neutral spread). Ho and Saunders (1981) interpret it as a measure of market power; markets with the most inelastic demand may be monopolist and obtain higher margins than a competitive market.
ii) The second term is the risk premium. iii) Representing the last term are average operating costs, which increase the institution's margin and are not affected by the low competitiveness or risk neutrality of the markets.
Empirical model
The empirical model first includes the determinants of the financial margin commonly used in commercial bank studies. Its applicability to microfinance is assessed.
The empirical model also adds exogenous variables to the theoretical model to consider microfinance-specific characteristics.
t=1,…T, T number of periods and i=1,….I, I number of MFIs. MARG is the financial margin, TM are the margin determinants according to the theoretical model and MFIS are the specific microfinance margin determinants. Credit risk. The model applied in banks predicts a positive relationship between margin and credit risk and the same could be expected in MFIs. The default probability of MFI borrowers must be correctly managed to minimize its impact on the margin. Giving loans to poor people without a credit history was the main innovation of the Grameen Bank by Yunus (1999) , who implemented the proverb: "the poor always pay back". MFIs monitor risk by using alternative systems to secure repayment, such as solidarity groups or peer monitoring (Krauss and Walter, 2009 
Risk neutral spread.
Competition is a key margin determinant in the financial sector.
Banks that face higher competition within a given country have lower margins (Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga, 1999) . This paper proposes the degree of financial inclusion as a measure of competition. In developed countries, most adults report that they have an The specific margin determinants for MFIs are as follows:
Average loan size. The average loan balance per borrower is an outreach indicator in microfinance (Navajas et al., 2000) . Small loans retain high fixed administrative costs. consequently, the percentage of women borrowers is considered a social performance indicator. Alesina et al. (2008) find that women pay a higher interest rate, although women are not riskier than men. Bellucci et al. (2010) and Beck et al. (2011) that NGOs, more socially driven than banks, charge higher interest rates and operate with lower margins. However, they target the poorest and their small loans have high costs, which would justify high margins. Credit cooperatives, whose members are coproprietaries, generally do not attempt to maximize profits unconditionally (Smith et al. 1981) . By contrast, it is expected that NBFI, which do not capture deposits, have high margins. (ALS < $300) contained pure MFIs, those that had not drifted from their mission due to only serving poor clients. MFIs in the other group (ALS > $300) are more similar to commercial banks, at least with regard to the type of clients served. These firms are expected to be more market oriented. Table 2 presents the exploratory analysis, which shows the mean of each variable, for every year, for the two groups of MFIs. A T-test for means was performed to identify the differences between the two groups.
Sample and results

Data
*** Table 2***
The margin was higher in the ALS < $300 group than in the ALS > $300 group and the differences are statistically significant for every year. The operating costs are higher in the ALS < $300 group than in the ALS > $300 group and the differences are statistically significant for every year. Margins and operating costs decrease each year, especially in the ALS < $300 group.
There are significant differences in size, and MFIs with ALS < $300 are smaller than All the results are coherent with the theoretical model. Some differences can be appreciated between both groups of MFIs, explained by their social commitment. For example, the group with ALS > $300 presents a negative correlation between margin and loan size; that is, a smaller loan is associated with a higher margin (-0.21 ). However, in the group with ALS < $300, a smaller loan is associated with a lower margin, although the correlation coefficient is low (0.1). A similar pattern is observed in the other social indicator. In the group with ALS > $300, a higher percentage of women borrowers implies a higher margin (0.20); however, the other group, with ALS < $300, does not present a significant correlation (0.03). An explanation can be based on the social character of pure MFIs, which give small loans, mainly directed at women. They try to keep their margins low with the aim of not charging high interest rates to their clients. They can do this because they receive donations. Significant differences can be found here: in MFIs with ALS < $300, higher donations lead to lower margin. The group of MFIs with ALS > $300
does not present significant correlations.
In MFIs with ALS > $300, higher deposits imply lower margin. The other group hardly shows any correlation. This finding may be interpreted as a difficulty of gaining profitability from small deposits. *** Bhargava and Sargan (1983) , in panels with a large number of individual units (MFIs) who are observed only for a few time periods, random effects model estimation may be the most appropriate, and fixed effects estimation may be inconsistent. Age has a negative relationship with margin but is only significant in entities with high loan size. A higher loan size and a higher age of the MFI imply a lower margin. This finding means that in this sector, maturity contributes to reduce the margin. Age and size are correlated; therefore, to avoid multicollinearity problems, size has not been included in the regression model.
Finally, financial inclusion presents a negative and significant relationship with margin in both groups. This finding means that a higher degree of financial inclusion is associated with a lower margin, as the model establishes.
The R2 of Model 1 is 0.57 for MFIs with ALS > $300, those closest to banks.
However, it is only 0.33 for the other group, with pure MFIs. The Chow test confirms the statistically significant differences in the model's explanatory capacity for both groups. It seems clear that for pure MFIs, which are more different from commercial banks than the other group of MFIs, the classical model has less explanatory power. This finding justifies the inclusion of specific variables. This does not happen in the other group, the one with pure MFIs. Notice that this variable is significant according to the Smith-Satterthwaite test of differences.
Finally, the rest of the models, from 5 to 8, include the MFIs' legal status. Neither
NGOs nor banks present a significant relationship with the margin. Credit cooperatives have the lowest margin, which is coherent with their type of ownership, which is composed of members. By contrast, the margin is high in NBFI.
Some final reflections may be made in an attempt to answer the research question posed in the introduction. The poverty penalty exists: the margin is higher in those MFIs with ALS < $300 than in the other group. However, this finding is not necessarily associated with mission drift but rather to high operating costs, which are the main margin determinants. The microfinance sector does not obtain high returns; in fact, most MFIs have a negative ROA. MFIs willing to reduce their margin and thus the poverty penalty can follow different strategies. The first one is to follow a turnover strategy, maximizing their outreach by offering many small loans while improving their efficiency. This strategy is consistent with the social mission of many MFIs and represents a means of achieving selfsustainability because profitability can be broken down into two factors: margin and turnover. Technologies to reduce operating costs in small loans should play a key role. The sector is already doing so because the margin is decreasing each year. The growth of MFIs leads to scale and learning economies. The second strategy is related to donations. Its role is positive because donations contribute to reduce the margin. Although many claim selfsustainability, MFIs serving the poorest with very small loans are those receiving donations. In our opinion, donations are totally justified for MFIs fighting on the front lines against financial exclusion. The third possibility is to reduce the margin by capturing deposits through regulation, which represent a cheap funding source. Again, efficient technology to reduce the high administrative costs of small deposits should be implemented.
Conclusions
MFIs provide loans to the financially excluded. Because they are financial institutions, their margin an important issue to keep in mind. However, unlike commercial banks, which try to maximize their margin, many MFIs are socially oriented, with the aim of maximizing outreach. This characteristic makes it necessary to adapt the banking models explaining the margin to this special case, which may present different margin determinants. This paper attempts to develop an explicative model for the microfinance margin.
An empirical study has been performed with panel data from over one thousand MFIs over 9 years. The sample has been divided into two groups: those with an average loan size over $300, and those with an average loan size under $300. This figure represents a threshold separating pure poverty orientation from market orientation.
The presence of a poverty penalty is confirmed: MFIs with low loans have high margins. This fact does not imply mission drift because this high margin is caused by high operating costs. These operating costs are the key variable determining margin, which is in line with studies on commercial banks. If MFIs wish to lower their margin to alleviate the poverty penalty suffered by their clients, the best way is by reducing these operating costs.
MFIs can choose a turnover strategy, giving many small loans. In addition, in every turnover-based business, keeping costs under control and being efficient and productive are key factors. It has also been found that solvency ratios follow the same pattern in microfinance as in commercial banks.
The study has discovered differences in size and age with respect to commercial banks' previous studies. A larger and more mature bank has a higher margin. However, microfinance is a young sector with an average life of less than 10 years in the dataset analyzed. MFIs are still in a learning process, lowering their costs, and it has been observed that the oldest and largest ones have the lowest margin, which is good news for these socially oriented institutions.
The role of donations remains important, and in general, entities receiving donations use them correctly because their margin is low. The same happens with deposits, which are a cheap funding source, and those regulated entities capturing deposits have low margin.
However, the effect of deposits on the margin is less important than that of operating costs, according to the regression coefficient.
The legal status matters because it is often associated with the social character of Finally, where the level of accessibility of banking services is low, the margin is high.
As the population's financial literacy grows and the spread of financial services leads to competition, the margin will decrease, as will the poverty penalty. This phenomenon represents an invitation to make microcredit more accessible and more affordable. Table 3 . Pooled Pearson's correlation coefficients for both groups. The top figures correspond to ALS > $300 group, with Average Loan Size over $300, and the figures in brackets correspond to the ALS < $300 group, with Average Loan Size under $300. (-4.81) (0.59) (-4 .94) (-1.18 ) (-4 .78) (-0 .88) (-5 .03) (-0.87) Financial inclusion -0.0005*** -0.0008*** -0.0004*** -0.008*** -0.0004*** -0.0008*** -0.0004** -0.0008** (-3.13 ) (-3.22 ) (-2.71 ) (-2.99 ) (-2.74 ) (-2.95 ) (-2.86 ) (-2 .82) .0432*** -0.0281*** -0.0430*** -0.0281*** -0.0385*** -0.0282*** (-5.65 ) (-5.20 ) (-4 .60) (-5.22 ) (-5.23 ) (-5 .08) Deposits -0.0099*** -0.0174*** -0.0106** -0.0180*** (-2.73) (-3 .32) (-2 .55) (-3 
